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MISS SUSAN’S ETIQUETTE TIPS FOR THE SOCIALLY 
CONSCIOUS JUDGE: A GUIDE TO HONORABLE CONDUCT 
TOWARD GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE COURTROOM 
BRADLEY ZANE HAUMONT* AND SUSAN ANN KOENIG** 
Dear Reader, 
You’re a judge, and you’re loving life.  The governor is a close, personal 
friend of the family.  You recently joined the most exclusive country club in 
town.  Your youngest daughter just graduated from Harvard Law School with 
honors.  Best of all, you have the satisfaction of sitting on a long, hard (but 
surprisingly comfortable) bench whenever you are not relaxing at the golf 
course.  You—and only you—make the difficult decisions that no one else is 
qualified to make.  You are at the pinnacle of your legal career.  Life is good. 
Then, from out of nowhere, the gay issue rears its well-coifed head, and 
suddenly you feel unbalanced.  Your law clerk just came out of the closet.  
Your spouse is nagging you to officiate at a cousin’s same-sex wedding in 
Boston.  Yesterday you received a survey from the American Civil Liberties 
Union testing your knowledge of gay and lesbian legal issues.  Tomorrow, a 
bisexual teacher will appear in your courtroom on a name change matter.  Next 
week, you must preside over a custody battle between two lesbian mothers 
who, until quite recently, were raising a child together.  The room starts to 
spin, and you find yourself feeling nostalgic for the simple days of your first 
year in law school. 
Never fear, Miss Susan is here!1  For more than thirty years, I’ve been the 
queen bee of gay and lesbian jurisprudence.  Through my extensively 
syndicated advice column, I’ve helped thousands of judges reason through the 
most flummoxing of gay and lesbian legal issues.  Moreover, I’ve been able to 
impart crucial words of wisdom to the judicial elite that make this country 
great.  Now, for the very first time, I have collected some of my most 
 
* Bradley Zane Haumont is a third year law student at the Creighton University School of Law in 
Omaha, Nebraska.  He holds a Bachelor of Science from the University of Nebraska at Omaha. 
** Susan Ann Koenig—who should not be confused with Miss Susan—has practiced law in 
Omaha, Nebraska, for the last 24 years.  The Law Office of Susan Ann Koenig, P.C. advocates 
for the legal rights of gay and lesbian clients. 
 1. Miss Susan is a fictional advice columnist who should not be confused with any person, 
living or dead—most especially not the authors. 
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inspirational columns for the edification of the larger judicial community.  
Here, you will gain fascinating insight into areas as diverse as criminal law, 
adoption law, family law, and name-change law. 
As you delve into my letters, you may notice an overarching theme—that 
good manners and good law often coincide.2  My philosophy is that if you can 
remember to be polite, to be respectful of others, and to acknowledge the 
essential humanity of every living person, you will almost always be guided to 
the correct legal conclusion.  Keep this in mind as you read the questions and 
answers that follow. 
Very truly yours, 
Miss Susan 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Miss Susan, 
Yesterday, a young man came into my courtroom and took the witness 
stand.  Would you believe he had the gall to admit under oath that he is a 
practicing homosexual?  I was so shocked that I almost fell off my bench!  
After a few minutes, though, I was overcome by a morbid sense of curiosity.  
It’s not that I’m gay or anything; it’s just that I’ve never met a homosexual 
before.  So I asked ten or fifteen rather intimate questions about the witness’s 
sexual proclivities.  Despite my restraint, the witness appeared to be offended 
by my questions.  Do I owe him an apology? 
Love, 
Judge Curious 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Judge Curious, 
A certain amount of curiosity is to be expected when meeting people with 
backgrounds and experiences which are different from our own.  It is therefore 
quite natural that you would have questions when meeting a gay man for the 
very first time.3  In satisfying your curiosity, however, you must be careful not 
to abandon common courtesy.  It sounds as if your questions dealt with the sort 
 
 2. In fact, Miss Susan’s personal motto is “Good Manners and Good Law Often Coincide.”  
She embroiders it on pillows in her spare time. 
 3. I doubt, however, that this is the first gay man you have met.  When considering Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), United States Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell 
remarked he did not believe he had ever met a homosexual before.  JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB 
PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 272-73 (2001).  
Ironically, Justice Powell was speaking to his gay law clerk.  Id. at 272. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] MISS SUSAN’S ETIQUETTE TIPS FOR THE SOCIALLY CONSCIOUS JUDGE 223 
 
of delicate, personal issues that most people would not enjoy answering in 
open court.  If your questions were not directly relevant to any legal issue in 
the case, then I can well imagine that the young man was offended.  As such, I 
believe you may owe him an apology. 
To assist you in the future, I have devised a simple rule of thumb: unless 
you know someone very well, don’t ask any personal questions that you 
wouldn’t feel comfortable asking your own mother.4  For instance, I do not 
want to know how many sexual partners my mother has had over the course of 
her lifetime; I therefore make it a rule never to ask a stranger (of any sexual 
orientation) how many sexual partners he or she has had.  Obviously, there 
may be times when your judicial duties will require you to violate the rule of 
thumb, but I think it will serve you well in most situations. 
I wish I had been able to give this advice to the Illinois judge who presided 
over In re C.M.A.,5 a lesbian adoption case.  In that case, the judge asked the 
petitioners several questions which can only be described as inappropriate.6  
The Appellate Court of Illinois was quite disturbed by the judge’s “insensitive 
probing and wrongful interrogation of the adoptive parents’ early sexual 
history.”7  The court found that this irrelevant line of questioning was evidence 
of the judge’s prejudice against lesbians.8 
I hope this case underscores the importance of apologizing to the young 
man.  I know it can be very difficult for a judge to acknowledge that he or she 
may have made a mistake, but I have the utmost respect for those who 
recognize when an apology is required.9 
Very truly yours, 
Miss Susan 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Miss Susan, 
 
 4. If this standard seems too subjective, then you could substitute “an objectively 
reasonable mother” for your mother. 
 5. 715 N.E.2d 674 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
 6. Id. at 676.  The appeals court did not articulate the precise questions asked, but stated 
that the lower court judge questioned “each petitioner regarding her ‘coming out’ process as a 
lesbian, her early sexual experiences, and whether petitioners were currently in a lesbian sexual 
relationship.”  Id. 
 7. Id. at 679. 
 8. Id.  The court found it proper that the judge had been removed from the case for bias.  Id. 
at 680. 
 9. Even Justice Powell eventually admitted that he had “probably made a mistake” in 
voting with the majority in Bowers.  MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 3, at 339. 
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Last week, Mr. P. and Mr. C., two gay men, came into my courtroom and 
asked me to change both their last names to Faerie.  Not only that, but Mr. P. 
wanted to change the last name of his six-year-old son, Harry, as well.  I have 
reviewed the name change laws for my state, and I know that I must refuse a 
name change if it is intended to perpetrate a fraud on the community.  I think it 
is fraudulent for them to hold themselves out as a family because gay marriage 
isn’t recognized in my state.  Naturally, I was forced to deny their petition.  
They must think they need special rights or something because they filed an 
appeal with the state supreme court.  Should I be worried about a reversal? 
Love, 
Judge Traditional 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Judge Traditional, 
My crystal ball is a little cloudy today, but when I gaze into your future, I 
get the distinct impression that you could be overruled on appeal.  Of course, 
I’m not a judge, so I can’t rely solely on mysticism to support my opinions.  
Perhaps what we both need here is some clarity. 
Your understanding of the law appears to be basically sound.  Most 
jurisdictions prevent a person from changing his or her name for fraudulent 
purposes.10  Most jurisdictions also refuse to extend marriage rights to gay and 
lesbian couples.11  I suspect, however, that you may have mixed up these two 
propositions of law when you ruled on the gay couple’s name change petition. 
I hope it may give you some small comfort to know that you’re not the 
only judge who confuses name change petitions with marriage licenses.  In a 
recent New Jersey case, In re Bacharach, a lesbian petitioned the court to 
hyphenate her last name to include the name of her life partner.12  The trial 
judge was concerned that members of the public would mistakenly believe that 
the women were legally married.13  He felt that even the slightest “imprimatur” 
of legitimizing a same-sex relationship would violate public policy, so he 
denied the petition.14 
The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court saw the case 
differently.  The court noted that it is improper for judges to impose personal 
 
 10. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:52-1 (2004); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 701(b) (2004). 
 11. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, para. 1; HAW. CONST. art. 
I, § 23; KY. CONST. § 233a; LA CONST. art. XII, § 15; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; OHIO CONST. art. 
XV, § 11; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29.  Massachusetts is the notable exception to the rule.  See 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
 12. In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579, 580 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 13. Id. at 580-81. 
 14. Id. at 581. 
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views on public policy when presiding over a name change proceeding.15  
Even if public policy were relevant, the court found that there was no public 
policy that would prevent same-sex partners from sharing a hyphenated 
surname.16 
Focusing on the heart of the trial judge’s objection to the proposed name 
change, the court correctly pointed out that the legality of gay marriage was 
not at issue in Bacharach.17  Dismissing the trial judge’s concerns about public 
confusion over the issue as “farfetched and inherently discriminatory,” the 
court went on to state that arguments equating a name change with the 
legalization of gay marriage were “specious.”18  The court then held that the 
proposed name change was not for fraudulent purposes and directed the trial 
judge to grant the petition.19 
The Bacharach opinion proved to be quite persuasive, and its reasoning 
was adopted by courts in New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania in cases with 
nearly identical facts.20  My crystal ball notwithstanding, this emerging trend in 
name-change law is what leads me to believe that your case might be reversed 
on appeal.  The lesson here is that name changes and marriages are entirely 
separate matters.  Do your best to keep them straight in the future. 
Before I close, I want to address one other concern.  I sense that you harbor 
a deep-seated disapproval of same-sex couples who “masquerade” as families 
by adopting the same surname.  I would just challenge you to open your mind 
to the possibility that they really are a family.  Same-sex couples often regard a 
name change as a method of publicly expressing their commitment to each 
other.21  A married person who adopts his or her spouse’s name is probably 
motivated by similar concerns.  If you look closely, I’m sure you’ll find 
evidence of other similarities between same-sex couples and other families. 
Very truly yours, 
 
 15. Id. at 584.  In a rare moment of modesty, the court admitted that “[j]udges have no 
monopoly on wisdom, no clairvoyance into the public mind and no right to impose personal 
views or values on the citizenry of our state.”  Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d at 585. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See In re Daniels, 773 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Civ. Ct. 2003); In re Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846 
(Ohio 2002); In re Miller, 824 A.2d 1207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 
 21. The petitioner in Bacharach eloquently summarized her reasons for changing her name: 
  What it will do for me is it will give me a more satisfying feeling that I have 
cultivated family . . . I am simply saying that I am committed to somebody in my life, that 
I want to express that commitment through adding a name to my name so that I can have a 
more solid . . . solid feeling of, this is my family.  The two of us are family. 
In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d at 585. 
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Miss Susan 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Miss Susan, 
I’m very worried about a ten-year-old girl whose custodial determination I 
have under advisement.  A psychologist (and renowned researcher from the 
local junior college) testified that if the mother is given custody, the child can 
expect to be ridiculed for the rest of her life because her mother is a defiant and 
hostile lesbian.  This is a very sweet little girl.  Should I deny custody to the 
mother, even though I have concerns about the alcoholic father? 
Love, 
Judge Concerned 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Judge Concerned, 
I can only imagine how anguishing it must be to have the fate of a child in 
your hands.  In weaker moments, I may envy your black robes and your 
dickeys, but I never envy the difficult custodial determinations that judges are 
often called upon to make.  While you alone must determine what is in the best 
interests of the child, I may be able to offer some observations to assist in your 
decision. 
The first thing to realize is that no one is perfect.  As human beings, every 
parent is certain to have both “good” qualities and “bad” qualities.22  Thus, in 
every custodial determination, the court will be called upon to choose between 
two flawed individuals.23  Rather than dwell on parental deficiencies, the court 
should focus its attention on the needs of the children.24 
Arguably, one factor a court could consider is a child’s need to be free 
from social stigma.  In M.P. v. S.P., the trial judge awarded custody to the 
father instead of the lesbian mother.25  On appeal, the father argued that the 
custodial determination should be upheld because the children would be 
embarrassed by their mother’s sexual orientation.26 
 
 22. In Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 985 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987), the court stated “[t]oo 
long have courts labored under the notion that divorced parents must somehow be perfect in every 
respect.  The law should recognize that parents, married or not, are individual human beings each 
with his or her own particular virtues and vices.” 
 23. In M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), the court noted 
that “the decision as to where custody shall lie must be made in terms of available alternatives.” 
 24. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d at 986. 
 25. M.P., 404 A.2d at 1257. 
 26. Id. at 1261. 
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The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court was not 
convinced by the father’s argument.27  The court observed that awarding 
custody to the father would not lessen any alleged embarrassment for the 
children.28  Their children would be subject to embarrassment whether their 
mother had custody or not.29  It was beyond the court’s power to shield the 
children from the social consequences of their mother’s sexual orientation.30 
Moreover, the court suggested that sheltering children from difficult 
realities may not be in their best interests.31  While the court candidly admitted 
that the children might face some adversity if the mother were given custody, it 
also held out hope that the children might learn valuable lessons along the 
way.32  For instance, the children would certainly learn “that we do not forsake 
those to whom we are indebted for love and nurture merely because they are 
held in low esteem by others.”33  Indeed, the court concluded that removing the 
children from their mother’s custody would deprive them of those qualities that 
they would need to cope with any social stigma that could flow from their 
mother’s sexual orientation.34 
In a similar case, Conkel v. Conkel, the Ohio Court of Appeals determined 
that popular disapproval of homosexuality should play no role in parent-child 
adjudications.35  The Conkel court found guidance in Palmore v. Sidoti, where 
the United States Supreme Court confronted social stigma flowing from 
interracial relationships.36  In Palmore, the trial court awarded custody to the 
father because he feared that the child would be stigmatized by her mother’s 
 
 27. Id. at 1262. 
 28. Id.  The court noted that “[n]either the prejudices of the small community in which they 
live nor the curiosity of their peers about defendant’s sexual nature will be abated by a change of 
custody.”  Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. M.P., 404 A.2d at 1262. 
 31. Id. at 1262-63. 
 32. Id. at 1263.  Although M.P. was decided in 1979, the lessons summarized by the court 
are equally relevant today: 
  It is just as reasonable to expect that they will emerge better equipped to search out 
their own standards of right and wrong, better able to perceive that the majority is not 
always correct in its moral judgments, and better able to understand the importance of 
conforming their beliefs to the requirements of reason and tested knowledge, not the 
constraints of currently popular sentiment or prejudice. 
Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  The court ultimately reversed the trial court’s custodial determination and awarded 
custody to the mother.  Id. 
 35. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d at 987.  While the issue in Conkel was visitation, the principle 
announced by the court is equally applicable in custody cases. 
 36. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
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cohabitation with an African-American.37  In reversing the custody decision, 
the Supreme Court stated that “[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the 
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”38 
Returning to your question, I would urge you to consider whether the 
child’s interests will be served by reflexively denying custody to the mother.  
Assuming for a moment that the child will be ridiculed for the rest of her life, 
granting custody to the father will not reduce the child’s exposure to ridicule.  
Her mother will still be a defiant and hostile lesbian.39  In any event, I’m not 
sure that the child of a lesbian mother has any greater potential for 
embarrassment than a child whose mother is obese. 
Putting all issues of social stigma to the side, the question before the court 
is whether an alcoholic father or a defiant mother is better equipped to meet 
this little girl’s needs in the future.  Although each faces personal challenges, 
I’m sure that both of her parents love her very much.  However, custody 
should be awarded to the parent who can best see to her physical and 
emotional well-being, regardless of that parent’s sexual orientation.40 
Very truly yours, 
Miss Susan 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Miss Susan, 
I’m reviewing a jury instruction for my first capital murder case.  The 
prosecutor has submitted the following recommended instruction: “If you find 
that the defendant is a faggot, you may weigh the defendant’s sexual 
orientation as an aggravating factor when you determine whether to impose the 
death penalty.”  I attended a two-hour sensitivity class three years ago, so I 
understand the importance of language in the courtroom.  The word “faggot” is 
obviously too inflammatory to be included in a jury instruction, but I’m unsure 
if it should be replaced with “gay man” or “practicing homosexual.”  What 
would you recommend? 
Love, 
Judge Sensitive 
 
 37. Id. at 431. 
 38. Id. at 433. 
 39. What exactly is a defiant and hostile lesbian?  The trial judge in Pleasant v. Pleasant, 
628 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), felt it was important to include the following in his 
findings of fact: “The respondent is a defiant and hostile admitted lesbian.”  I’m thinking of 
founding a group called “Defiant and Hostile Lesbians” (DHL) to advocate for lesbian legal 
rights. 
 40. See In re R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6, 9 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). 
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_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Judge Sensitive, 
I applaud your attention to language in the courtroom.  Everyone, 
regardless of sexual orientation, feels more comfortable when judges avoid 
unnecessarily harsh and abrasive language.  You are of course correct that the 
word “faggot” is almost never used in polite society.  I’m shocked that a 
prosecutor would even proffer such an instruction! 
While we are on the subject of language, I would also advise you to steer 
clear of the phrase “practicing homosexual.”  The word “practicing” (or “non-
practicing”) in this context is apparently meant to indicate whether a person is 
sexually active or not.  In my opinion, this is really too much information for 
most conversations.  For instance, I don’t imagine that my grandfather has 
been sexually active for several years now, but I doubt he would like being 
called a non-practicing heterosexual.  If you need to refer to a person’s same-
sex orientation, the words “gay” and “lesbian” are appropriately descriptive 
and inoffensive. 
This leads me to the bigger problem with the jury instruction you are 
reviewing.  I think if you carefully review the death penalty laws in your state, 
you’ll find that sexual orientation is not listed among the aggravating factors 
for the jury to consider.41  You may find factors like previous criminal 
convictions42 or the atrocious nature of the crime,43 but a defendant’s sexual 
orientation is almost always irrelevant to the sentence imposed. 
In those cases where prosecutors or judges have attempted to introduce 
irrelevant allegations of sexual orientation into jury deliberations, appellate 
courts have been less than forgiving.  For instance, in United States v. Birrell, 
the prosecutor urged the jury to convict the defendant because he was “a 
homosexual and a car thief and a credit card thief” who could not be turned 
loose on society.44  In a per curiam opinion, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction because the prosecutor’s 
statements invited the jury to convict simply because the defendant was a 
homosexual, without regard to the defendant’s guilt or innocence.45 
In Neill v. Gibson, a capital murder case, the prosecutor in his closing 
argument reminded the jury that they were “deciding life or death on a person 
that’s a vowed [sic] homosexual.”46  After defense counsel unsuccessfully 
 
 41. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1) (2004). 
 42. See, e.g., id. § 29-2523(1)(a). 
 43. See, e.g., id. § 29-2523(1)(c). 
 44. United States v. Birrell, 421 F.2d 665, 666 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). 
 45. Id. at 666. 
 46. Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1060 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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objected, the prosecutor told the jury that, while sexual orientation was not an 
aggravating factor, they needed to consider “the type of person” they were 
sentencing.47  The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
characterized the prosecutor’s remarks as “improper” and stated that there was 
no legitimate justification for them.48 
Even outside the capital arena, injecting references to sexual orientation 
into the jury process can be suspect.  In Muzzy v. Cahillane Motors, Inc., a 
sexual harassment lawsuit, the trial judge instructed the jury to evaluate the 
plaintiff’s claim from the vantage point of “an objectively reasonable woman 
of lesbian orientation.”49  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
reminded trial judges that providing unnecessary context to a reasonable 
person jury instruction could conjure negative stereotypes in the minds of the 
jury.50  The court cautioned against including any irrelevant personal 
characteristics in jury instructions.51 
Returning to your question, I would recommend that you not use the 
proffered jury instruction both because it is an inaccurate statement of the law 
and because it makes unnecessary reference to the defendant’s sexual 
orientation.  The jury in your capital murder case needs to struggle with 
difficult questions.  If the jurors were allowed to consider the defendant’s 
sexual orientation, they might be tempted to give in to their own prejudices 
rather than face the real issues before them.  While I’m not usually an advocate 
of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policies, I think justice will be best served in this 
case by limiting the jury’s access to any information that could distract them 
from their task. 
Very truly yours, 
Miss Susan 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Miss Susan, 
 
 47. Id. at 1061. 
 48. Id.  Without condoning the prosecutor’s conduct, the court ultimately affirmed denial of 
the defendant’s habeas corpus petition.  Id. at 1064.  The court held that improper remarks did not 
result in an unfair sentence because there was overwhelming evidence that the defendant’s crime 
was particularly heinous.  Id. at 1061-62. 
 49. Muzzy v. Cahillane Motors, Inc., 749 N.E.2d 691, 697 (Mass. 2001).  I cannot help 
wondering how an objectively reasonable woman of lesbian orientation differs from a reasonable 
person. 
 50. Id. at 696. 
 51. Id.  The court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal because the plaintiff’s attorney agreed to 
the jury instruction before trial.  Id. at 697. 
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I have a single-parent lesbian adoption case coming up for final hearing 
next week.  Although nothing in my state’s law explicitly prevents a 
homosexual from adopting, I know in my heart of hearts that it can never be 
right for a child to grow up with a pervert for a mother.  Anyway, I don’t see 
why a lesbian would want children in the first place.  Homosexuals are well-
known for their promiscuous lifestyles, so she would never be able to provide a 
stable home for anything bigger than a pussycat.  Why can’t she just be happy 
with a house full of cats? 
Love, 
Judge Vigilant 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Judge Vigilant, 
I remember reading once about an aboriginal society where children are so 
precious that the word “child” also means “wealth.”  Cats are nice animals, but 
they don’t enrich your life in quite the same way that a child does.  (For one 
thing, children are much more affectionate than cats.)  People who want to 
adopt recognize both the intrinsic value of a child and the difference they could 
make in the life of a child who is otherwise without parents.52  In that respect, I 
suspect that gays and lesbians are no different than any other prospective 
parents. 
Naturally, you are not the first judge to consider an adoption by a gay or 
lesbian petitioner.  In re Charles B. was an Ohio Supreme Court case dealing 
with this exact situation.53  In resolving the issue, the court decided to treat gay 
and lesbian adoptions just like any other adoption and looked to the best 
interests of the child.54  Although the petitioner was a gay man, nearly all of 
the evidence adduced at trial supported a conclusion that the petitioner would 
be a loving and supportive father.55  There was no evidence that his sexual 
orientation would be detrimental to the welfare of the child.56  Thus, the court 
overruled a lower appeals court ruling that homosexuals are per se ineligible to 
adopt in Ohio.57  In doing so, the Court stressed that “all relevant factors” must 
 
 52. Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of Health & Human Services, Remarks at the National 
Council for Adoption Awards Banquet (Mar. 26, 2003) (transcript available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/speech/2003/030326.html). 
 53. In re Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884, 885 (Ohio 1990). 
 54. Id. at 886. 
 55. Id. at 888-89. 
 56. Id. at 888. 
 57. Id. at 885, 890. 
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be considered in determining the best interests of the child, suggesting that the 
lower court erred in focusing on a single factor to the exclusion of all others.58 
This sort of single-minded focus may have been the crucial flaw for an 
Illinois judge in In re C.M.A.59  Despite clear precedent stating that sexual 
orientation is irrelevant in adoption cases,60 the lower court judge refused to 
grant two lesbian adoption petitions.61  In a bizarre twist, the lower court judge 
joined the unrelated adoption cases together and appointed the Family 
Research Council, a conservative think tank, as a “secondary guardian” to 
advocate the anti-gay point of view.62  Even after she was removed from the 
case for bias, she claimed that her removal had been unwarranted and 
continued to issue orders in the case.63  The Appellate Court of Illinois found 
that the judge “obviously had a predetermined bias against lesbians” and 
affirmed the adoptions.64  In doing so, the court remarked that “[n]o judge has 
the right or authority to ignore the rules governing our administration of 
justice.”65 
Although I can see that you are uncomfortable with the petitioner’s sexual 
orientation, I wonder if your objections to her “lesbian lifestyle” are based 
more on stereotypes than empirical data.  Social science research suggests that 
children raised in gay and lesbian homes develop normally and lead healthy, 
happy lives.66  Perhaps you should look at this case again and ask yourself 
whether you are also focusing too much on the petitioner’s sexual orientation 
and not enough on the best interests of the child. 
Very truly yours, 
Miss Susan 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Miss Susan, 
My favorite Bible story when I was a little boy was the story of Sodom and 
Gomorrah.67  As a judge, I sometimes feel the need to look beyond man’s law 
to the higher law that binds us all together as a civilization.  In those moments, 
 
 58. In re Charles B., 522 N.E.2d at 889. 
 59. In re C.M.A., 715 N.E.2d 674 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
 60. See In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 61. In re C.M.A., 715 N.E.2d at 676-77. 
 62. Id. at 678-79. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 679, 681. 
 65. Id. at 679. 
 66. See Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A 
Social Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 191, 202 (1995). 
 67. Genesis 19:1-30. 
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I return to Sodom and Gomorrah for a solid legal precedent.  Recently, I read 
the entire story of Sodom and Gomorrah into the record at the end of a bench 
trial right after I found that the gay defendant was guilty of first degree purse-
snatching.  I just don’t understand why the state supreme court vacated the 
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.  Can you help? 
Love, 
Judge Pious 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Judge Pious, 
I regard my own spirituality as a source of strength and passion, so I can 
appreciate that religious teachings play a central role in your life.  However, 
you must not allow your religious beliefs to interfere with your judicial duties.  
Careless sermonizing in the courtroom can lead to unfortunate and unexpected 
results. 
Let me illustrate my point with a parable from the State of Nebraska.  In 
State v. Pattno, the presiding judge read aloud from a long biblical passage 
referring to homosexuality before sentencing a gay defendant.68  The defendant 
appealed his sentence, arguing that the judge was biased against him because 
of his sexual orientation.69 
In analyzing the case, the Nebraska Supreme Court began by noting that 
criminal offenses (and the sentence imposed for committing a crime) are 
mandated by statute.70  The defendant’s sexual orientation was irrelevant to 
either his crime or his sentence, so the biblical passage was similarly 
irrelevant.71 
The court also expressed concerns over the separation of church and 
state.72  Although there may be instances where a judge can properly express 
religious beliefs in the courtroom, the court discouraged the use of scripture in 
sentencing proceedings because it could appear that the judge is relying on 
personal religious views rather than the statute when determining the proper 
sentence.73 
 
 68. State v. Pattno, 579 N.W.2d 503, 505-06 (Neb. 1998).  Although the court did not 
provide a citation, the passage appears to be Romans 1:20-28. 
 69. Pattno, 579 N.W.2d at 506. 
 70. Id. at 508. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 508-09. 
 73. Id. at 509.  The court was influenced by United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 
1991), where the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that courts “cannot sanction 
sentencing procedures that create the perception of the bench as a pulpit from which judges 
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When a judge relies on irrelevant considerations in sentencing a defendant, 
a reasonable person could be led to believe that the judge is biased.74  Thus, the 
court found that there was at least an appearance of bias because the presiding 
judge may have relied on his own irrelevant religious beliefs when sentencing 
the defendant.75  The sentence was therefore vacated because defendant was 
denied due process of law.76 
Your purse-snatching case is very similar to Pattno.  The story of Sodom 
and Gomorrah had nothing to do with purse-snatching, so your state supreme 
court may have questioned whether you were convicting the defendant of 
purse-snatching or sodomy.  Since sodomy is not illegal,77 your supreme court 
may have felt that the best course of action was to remand for a new trial on 
the charge of purse-snatching alone.  In the future, I would recommend that 
you read the story of Sodom and Gomorrah in church rather than in court.78 
Very truly yours, 
Miss Susan 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Miss Susan, 
I recently had a young professional mother come before me seeking to 
retain custody of her children.  The evidence showed that she supports the 
Lambda Legal Defense Fund,79 the Human Rights Campaign,80 and the 
 
announce their personal sense of religiosity and simultaneously punish defendants for offending 
it.”  Pattno, 579 N.W.2d at 508 (quoting Bakker, 925 F.2d at 740). 
 74. Pattno, 579 N.W.2d at 509. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 78. If nothing else, I hope you will learn from your mistakes.  Recently, the Pattno trial 
judge decided to disregard Pattno when sentencing a different defendant in a factually similar 
case.  State v. Bruna, 686 N.W.2d 590, 617-18 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004).  Prefacing his comments 
with “I would probably be better off not saying anything,” the judge stated that “[i]f people would 
continue to read [the Bible], they would find that it’s not a message of condemnation, but of 
hope.”  Id. at 617.  The Nebraska Court of Appeals found that the trial judge’s insertion of his 
own personal religious views was “explicit and unmistakable.”  Id. at 619.  Thus, the trial judge 
had again deprived a defendant of due process, and the case was remanded for another 
sentencing.  Id. 
 79. Lambda Legal is “a national organization committed to achieving full recognition of the 
civil rights of lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, the transgendered, and people with HIV or AIDS 
through impact litigation, education, and public policy work.”  LAMBDA LEGAL, at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/index.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
 80. The Human Rights Campaign is the largest gay and lesbian organization in the United 
States.  It is “a bipartisan organization that works to advance equality based on sexual orientation 
and gender expression and identity, to ensure that gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender 
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American Civil Liberties Union.81  She admitted on the witness stand that she 
often has private parties in her home on weekends when the children visit their 
father—parties where homosexuals are sometimes seen touching each other 
and kissing and fondling.  It was so perverted that I almost had to call a recess 
and go to my private judicial toilet.  Just the thought of it made me sick!  
Admittedly, there was no direct evidence that she was a lesbian (and she 
certainly didn’t look like a lesbian).  However, I think I should consider her 
apparent homoerotic tendencies when making my findings on the best interests 
of the children.  This is a really important factor, isn’t it? 
Love, 
Judge Squeamish 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Judge Squeamish, 
I’m not sure I agree with your assertion that this woman has “homoerotic 
tendencies.”  Certainly, she has some gay friends and she donates money to 
gay-friendly organizations, but that doesn’t necessarily make her a lesbian.  It 
may simply indicate that she is open-minded and supportive of gay and lesbian 
rights.  I am acquainted with many straight people who feel the same way.  As 
a judge, you should be careful about making assumptions. 
That being said, let’s go ahead and assume for a moment that the mother in 
your case is a lesbian.  There is a growing consensus in the legal community 
that a parent’s sexual orientation is largely irrelevant in child custody 
determinations.82  For instance, in Hassenstab v. Hassenstab, the father sought 
a change in custody after the mother began an intimate relationship with 
another woman.83  In looking at this case, the Nebraska Court of Appeals 
examined prior custody cases involving heterosexual parents.84  In those cases, 
the Nebraska Supreme Court announced that a parent’s sexual activity could 
 
Americans can be open, honest and safe at home, at work and in the community.”  HUMAN 
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, at http://www.hrc.org/ 
Template.cfm?Section=About_HRC (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
 81. The American Civil Liberties Union works “to defend and preserve the individual rights 
and liberties guaranteed to every person in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.”  AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE ACLU: WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE DO, at 
http://www.aclu.org/about/aboutmain.cfm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
 82. See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985); Jacoby v. Jacoby, 763 
So.2d 410, 413-15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); In re Marriage of R.S., 677 N.E.2d 1297, 1301-02 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Hassenstab v. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d 368, 372-74 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997); 
Damron v. Damron, 670 N.W.2d 871, 875-76 (N.D. 2003). 
 83. See Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d at 372-73. 
 84. Id. 
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not justify a change in custody “absent a showing that the minor child or 
children were exposed to such activity or were adversely affected or damaged 
by reason of such activity.”85  The court of appeals determined that the same 
rule should apply to both heterosexual and homosexual parents.86  Since there 
was no evidence that the child had been exposed to any sexual activity or that 
she had been harmed by the relationship, the court found that custody should 
remain with the mother.87 
As in Hassenstab, it seems that the mother in your case has been suitably 
discreet, as any good mother would be.  Although gays and lesbians 
occasionally hug and kiss at her parties, it does not appear that her children 
were in attendance at those parties.  Even if they had been present, I would 
hardly consider normal affection between consenting adults to be harmful to 
children.88  Had the affection been heterosexual rather than homosexual in 
nature, I doubt you would have given it a second thought. 
This leads me to my real point: I think you are uncomfortable with gays 
and lesbians.  Please understand that this is merely an observation and not an 
accusation.  The important thing for you to do is recognize your own 
discomfort and then move past it.  As a judge, your paramount concern must 
be the best interests of the child.  Putting aside your personal feelings about the 
mother’s sexual orientation, you must ask yourself whether a change of 
custody is really warranted.  Viewed from that angle, you may decide that this 
mother isn’t so bad, even if she does support the American Civil Liberties 
Union. 
Very truly yours, 
Miss Susan 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Miss Susan, 
I have this recurring nightmare that one day I will preside over a medical 
malpractice case where the entire jury is composed of gays and lesbians and 
transvestites.  In my dream, I can’t tell which jurors are the gays, which are the 
lesbians, and which are the transvestites.  (They all cross their legs exactly the 
same way.)  My therapist tells me that my dreams are caused by a repressed 
 
 85. Id. (citing Smith-Helstrom v. Yonker, 544 N.W.2d 93, 100 (Neb. 1996); Kennedy v. 
Kennedy, 380 N.W.2d 300, 303 (Neb. 1986); Krohn v. Krohn, 347 N.W.2d 869, 872-73 (Neb. 
1984)). 
 86. Id. at 370 (syllabus by the court ¶ 9). 
 87. Id. at 373. 
 88. In Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 642 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), the court observed that 
“[s]eeing two consenting adults hug and kiss in a friendly manner is not harmful to [the minor 
child].”  The consenting adults in Pleasant were the child’s mother and her female partner.  Id. 
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oedipal complex from my childhood.  He encouraged me to circulate a 
memorandum among the prosecutors in my jurisdiction suggesting that 
preemptory challenges should be used to prevent all gays, lesbians, and 
transvestites from serving on juries.  Although I was mostly motivated by my 
desire to make peace with my inner child, I also think that eliminating 
undesirable elements from juries will be a great contribution to my community.  
Don’t you think so, too? 
Love, 
Judge Freud 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Judge Freud, 
I wish you well on your journey of self-discovery!  I wish more judges and 
attorneys could recognize when they need psychological counseling and seek 
assistance.  I would, however, caution you on taking legal counsel from your 
therapist.  While a therapist may be able to identify psychologically healing 
actions, those actions may not always comport with your judicial duties. 
I would first direct your attention to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.  
Paragraph B(5) of Cannon 3 provides that “[a] judge shall not, in the 
performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or 
prejudice . . . based upon . . . sexual orientation.”89  I suspect that your 
memorandum could be perceived as conduct that is prejudicial toward gays 
and lesbians.  Thus, your memorandum could provoke an ethics investigation. 
Your memorandum also reminds me of People v. Garcia,90 a relatively 
recent case from California.  In Garcia, the trial judge, over the defense’s 
objection, allowed the prosecutor to dismiss two known lesbians during jury 
voir dire.91  The defendant challenged his conviction based on the exclusion of 
gays and lesbians from the jury.92 
The California Court of Appeals began by analyzing United States 
Supreme Court cases barring racial and gender discrimination in jury 
selection.93  From these cases, the Garcia court determined that that juries 
 
 89. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (2000). 
 90. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (Ct. App. 2000). 
 91. Id. at 340, 348-49.  Garcia was a run-of-the-mill burglary case which did not otherwise 
involve issues related to sexual orientation.  Id. at 340, 348.  The potential jurors were questioned 
about their sexual orientation because they were both employed by a gay and lesbian foundation.  
See id. at 340. 
 92. Id. at 340-41. 
 93. The Garcia court examined Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), J.E.B. v. Alabama 
ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).  Garcia, 92 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 341-43. 
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must be representative of the community94 and that “cognizable groups” within 
the community may not be systematically excluded from jury service.95  A 
“cognizable group” is one whose members share a common perspective which 
is caused by membership in the group.96  Exclusion based on group 
membership is impermissible because the practice relies on stereotypes to 
determine whether a juror is competent or impartial.97  Excluding cognizable 
groups from juries also reduces the fact-finding potential of the jury.98 
The court found that gays and lesbians were a cognizable group because 
they “share the common perspective of having spent their lives in a sexual 
minority, either exposed to or fearful of persecution and discrimination.”99  
Since the community was “entitled to have that perspective represented in the 
jury” room,100 the court held that gays and lesbians could not be excluded from 
jury service solely because of their sexual orientation.101  In an effort to better 
guard the jury room against discrimination, the court directed that potential 
jurors should not be questioned about their sexual orientation.102 
At this time, California is the only state to protect gays and lesbians in jury 
voir dire.103  However, even if you do not live in California, the Garcia case 
demonstrates that restricting gay and lesbian participation in the judicial 
process may not benefit your community.  If your intention in sending the 
memorandum was to make a positive contribution, perhaps you should pause 
and reconsider.  Maybe your therapist could recommend another method of 
getting in touch with your inner child—one that won’t violate judicial ethics 
rules. 
Very truly yours, 
 
 94. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342.  See also Taylor, 419 U.S. at 528. 
 95. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 343.  See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. 
 96. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 343.  A common perspective refers to something akin to 
common experiences—it does not mean that all members of the group share the same opinion.  
Id. at 344. 
 97. Id. at 342, 344.  See also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129. 
 98. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 344-45.  The United States Supreme Court once observed 
that “[w]hen any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, 
the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human 
experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.”  Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 
493, 503 (1972). 
 99. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 344. 
 100. Id. at 346. 
 101. Id. at 347. 
 102. Id.  The court remanded the case to determine whether the lesbians were excluded from 
the jury because of their sexual orientation or for a constitutionally permissible reason.  Id. at 
348-49. 
 103. In 2000, the California legislature codified the result in Garcia.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 204 (West 2004). 
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Miss Susan 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Miss Susan, 
In a recent family relations case, three credible witnesses testified that a 
lesbian mother was seen holding hands with another woman at a Unitarian 
Church picnic (an organization that is known to be a haven for lesbians).  A 
framed photograph of the mother embracing the same woman in front of the 
Statute of Liberty was also introduced into evidence.  I am concerned that the 
children will suffer from irreparable gender identity confusion if they are 
exposed to the lascivious behavior of their mother.  Mothers are supposed to be 
role models for their children!  I grudgingly granted visitation to the mother, 
but only in the presence of a heterosexual employee of the state department of 
social services, and never in the presence of another homosexual.  Do you 
think I should have gone further and denied all contact between the mother and 
the children? 
Love, 
Judge Scandalized 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Judge Scandalized, 
I’m not sure why you restricted visitation at all.  The mother in this case 
appears to be a patriotic, church-going woman who is in a committed and 
loving relationship.  I would say that she is an ideal role model for her 
children.  Nevertheless, I see that you are concerned about the impact that the 
mother’s new relationship may have on her children.  I may be able to address 
those concerns by examining decisions of other courts in similar cases. 
In Pleasant v. Pleasant, the trial judge ordered supervised visitation for a 
lesbian mother.104  The trial judge was concerned because the mother was 
involved in a relationship with another woman and because she had attended a 
gay pride parade with her son.105  In a rather amusing episode, the judge asked 
whether there had been any “unmasculine” men at the pride parade.106  When 
 
 104. Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 634-35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).  The judge initially 
offered the mother unsupervised visitation if she would agree not to exercise visitation in the 
presence of “any other person of known homosexual tendencies” or at “any gathering or place of 
a ‘homosexual nature.’”  Id. at 637.  The mother candidly told the judge that she would not be 
able to abide by his conditions.  Id. 
 105. Id. at 636. 
 106. Id. at 637. 
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the mother denied that she had seen any unmasculine men, “the judge argued 
with her about the presence of so-called ‘unmasculine’ men.”107 
On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois found that the restrictions were 
unwarranted.108  The court noted that “[t]here is a strong public policy to 
preserve the relationship between a parent and child,” and liberal visitation is 
generally preferred.109  Visitation should only be restricted if the child would 
be endangered by visitation.110  Since the court found no evidence that the 
child had been harmed by his mother’s relationship or by the trip to the pride 
parade, the restrictions on visitation were removed.111 
Applying a slightly different standard, Maryland’s highest court reached a 
similar conclusion in Boswell v. Boswell.112  In Boswell, the trial judge 
restricted a gay father’s visitation by prohibiting overnight visits and to 
exclude the father’s male partner from being present during visitation.113 
On review, the Maryland Court of Appeals began with the presumption 
that “the child’s best interests are served by reasonable maximum exposure to 
both parents.”114  As in Pleasant, visitation could only be restricted if the child 
were subject to actual or potential harm.115  The court emphasized, however, 
that a finding of actual or potential harm must be supported by evidence rather 
than stereotypes or personal bias.116  The court found no evidence that the 
children had been harmed by the relationship.117  Therefore, the restrictions 
were removed because they were not in the children’s best interests.118 
Pleasant and Boswell illustrate the importance of contact between non-
custodial parents and their children.  Although it is sometimes difficult for a 
child to adjust to a parent’s new relationship, the parent is still an important 
part of the child’s life.  If it isn’t too late, I would urge you to reconsider your 
decision to restrict visitation in this case.  You should ask yourself whether the 
mother’s relationship with another woman really endangers the welfare of the 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 635. 
 109. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d at 640. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 635, 642.  The court noted that the child appeared to have enjoyed the pride parade.  
Id. at 642. 
 112. Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662 (Md. 1998). 
 113. Id. at 665.  In addition to the father’s partner, the visitation order also excluded “anyone 
having homosexual tendencies . . . or . . . anyone that the father may be living with in a non-
marital relationship.”  Id. 
 114. Id. at 672. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 678. 
 117. Boswell, 721 A.2d at 678-79. 
 118. Id. at 679. 
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children.  On taking a second look, you may see that the best interests of the 
children are better served by a more liberal visitation schedule. 
Very truly yours, 
Miss Susan 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Miss Susan, 
I’m up for re-election next month, so I’m anxious not to offend any gay or 
lesbian voters.  Unfortunately, I get really flustered when a homosexual 
appears in my courtroom.  Are they called “lesbians” or “homosexual 
women”?  And what exactly is a “lipstick lesbian”?  Is the word “gay” an 
adjective or a noun?  When is it appropriate to say “queer”?  When they show 
up in pairs, should I assume that they are paramours?  Please help!  The 
election is coming up very soon! 
Love, 
Judge Candidate 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Judge Candidate, 
Good luck in the upcoming election!  I admire your willingness to learn 
how to respectfully address your gay and lesbian constituents.  I think you’ll 
find that the terminology is not so difficult.  As with many other endeavors, 
ordinary common sense will serve you well.  For example, I’m sure you 
already know that the word “homo” is unconscionably rude and should not be 
used in polite company. 
Of course, a sterling vocabulary is not achieved simply by eliminating 
colorful middle-school taunts from everyday usage, so I am happy to answer 
your questions about proper word choice.  The terms “gay” and “lesbian” are 
generally inoffensive and can be correctly used as either nouns or adjectives.119  
The phrase “homosexual woman” is new to me, but it sounds awkward and 
overly clinical, so I would advise you to avoid it.  A “lipstick lesbian” is just a 
very feminine lesbian.  This is a slang term, so you should probably avoid it as 
well. 
The word “queer” is more problematic.  In the past, the word “queer” was 
a mean-spirited euphemism for “homosexual.”120  For older gays and lesbians, 
 
 119. See Amy Miller, Professionalism and Sexual Orientation, NEB. LAW., Jan. 2004, at 8. 
 120. Id. 
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the word has strong negative connotations.121  However, the word has been 
reclaimed, and it is not uncommon for younger gays and lesbians to self-
identify as “queer.”122  My own rule of thumb is that I don’t use the word 
“queer” when speaking to anyone who is older than me.  As a judge, though, 
you may wish to be more cautious and avoid the word altogether.123 
When you see gays and lesbians in groups of two, you should not assume 
that they have an intimate relationship.  They may just be friends.  I’m sure 
you have friends of the opposite sex with whom you are not intimate.  Gays 
and lesbians are not so different. 
If it turns out that they are a couple, I would caution you to avoid the word 
“paramour.”  A paramour is an illicit lover.124  The word “illicit” means 
unlawful,125 and there is nothing unlawful about gay or lesbian relationships.126  
Instead, I would recommend that you say “life partner” or “companion.” 
I hope that these suggestions on word choice will help you feel more 
comfortable when you see gays and lesbians in your courtroom.  Remember 
that common sense and good manners will assist you in nearly every situation 
you encounter.  Again, I wish you well in the upcoming election. 
Very truly yours, 
Miss Susan 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Dear Reader, 
I hope that after reading the foregoing letters you will have gained some 
insight into the world and gay and lesbian jurisprudence.  Perhaps you have 
realized that gays and lesbians are really not so different from any other person 
who finds his or her way into your courtroom.  More to the point, perhaps you 
noticed that the legal standard applied in any given case does not vary with the 
sexual orientation of the parties involved in the litigation. 
If nothing else, I hope you may learn from the mistakes of other judges 
who were less than kind to the gay and lesbian individuals who appeared 
before them.  If you can remember my personal motto—that good manners and 
good law often coincide—I’m sure your opinions will always be just and well-
reasoned. 
Very truly yours, 
 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Ms. Miller also recommends avoiding the word.  Id. 
 124. OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIC ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1055 (1991). 
 125. Id. at 709. 
 126. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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Miss Susan 
 
